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bank net interest margins and overhead costs using data on over 1,400 banks across 72 countries
while controlling for bank-specific characteristics. The data indicate that tighter regulations on bank
entry and bank activities boost the cost of financial intermediation. Inflation also exerts a robust,
positive impact on bank margins and overhead costs. While concentration is positively associated
with net interest margins, this relationship breaks down when controlling for regulatory impediments
to competition and inflation. Furthermore, bank regulations become insignificant when controlling
for national indicators of economic freedom or property rights protection, while these institutional
indicators robustly explain cross-bank net interest margins and overhead expenditures. Thus, bank
regulations cannot be viewed in isolation; they reflect broad, national approaches to private property
and competition.
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This paper assesses the impact of bank regulations, market structure, and national 
institutions on the cost of intermediation as measured by bank net interest margins and bank 
overhead expenditures.  Banks mobilize and allocate society’s savings and the efficiency with 
which they intermediate capital has substantive repercussions on economic performance 
(Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; 
Wurgler, 2000; Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000; and Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000).  Thus, 
research on the determinants of the cost of intermediation will naturally enter the policy dialogue 
(Group of Ten, 2001; Bank for International Settlements, 2001; and International Monetary 
Fund, 2001). 
Theory provides conflicting predictions about the relationships among regulations, 
concentration, institutions, and bank efficiency.  Many of these differences arise because of 
differing beliefs about the causes of bank concentration.  One common view holds that 
regulatory impediments to competition and monopolistic power create an environment in which 
a few powerful banks stymie competition with deleterious implications for efficiency.  From this 
perspective, high concentration is a useful signal of an uncompetitive and hence inefficient 
market.  Alternatively, the “efficient-structure” theory argues that more efficient banks have 
lower costs and garner greater market share (Demsetz, 1973; Pelzman, 1977).
1  From this 
perspective, competitive environments may produce concentrated and efficient banking systems.  
Finally, a growing literature holds that some countries have institutions that restrict competition 
to protect a powerful elite (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Acemoglu, et al., 2001; Haber et al., 
                                                 
1 Scale economies may also drive banking to a monopolistic structure (Diamond, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 1986).   
  12003).
2 According to this “institutions” view, bank regulations and concentration reflect broader 
institutional characteristics rather than representing independent determinants of bank efficiency.  
To assess the impact of bank regulations, the usefulness of concentration as a signal, and to 
understand the role of national institutions in shaping regulations and market structure, one needs 
to examine individual banks operating in distinct regulatory and institutional environments. 
This is the first study to examine the influence of bank regulations, concentration, and 
institutional development on bank margins and overhead expenditures across a broad cross 
section of countries while controlling for bank specific factors and cross-country differences in 
macroeconomic and financial sector conditions.  We use bank-level data across 72 countries and 
over 1,400 banks.  This sample includes great diversity in terms of the cost of financial 
intermediation, other bank characteristics, bank regulations, macroeconomic and financial 
conditions, and national institutions.  New data on bank regulations allow us to contribute to the 
public policy debate and help distinguish among theoretical models by studying the regulatory, 
market structure, and institutional determinants of the cost of intermediation.  
We examine two dependent variables to gauge the cost of financial intermediation: the 
net interest margin and overhead expenditures.  The net interest margin equals interest income 
minus interest expense divided by interest-bearing assets.  The net interest margin measures the 
gap between what the bank pays savers and what the bank receives from borrowers.  Thus, the 
net interest margin focuses on the traditional borrowing and lending operations of the bank.  The 
overhead expenditure ratio is computed by dividing bank overhead costs by the total assets of the 
bank.  Cost inefficiencies and market power may be reflected in high overhead costs.  Though 
subject to measurement problems discussed below, the net interest margin and overhead 
                                                 
2 For an analysis of the politics fostering bank deregulation and policies, see Kroszner and Strahan (1999) and Rajan 
and Zingales (2003). 
  2expenditures reflect the pure operational efficiency of the bank and the competitive nature of the 
banking market.  For brevity, we focus on the results using bank net interest margins because the 
two dependent variables yield remarkably similar findings. 
To assess and interpret accurately the relationship between the cost of intermediation and 
regulations, concentration, and national institutions, we need to account for the fact that banks 
differ within countries and banks differ systematically across countries.  At a country-level, we 
control for differences in what the term “bank” means.  That is, we control for differences in 
banks’ ability to conduct securities market, insurance, and real estate operations, and whether 
banks can own nonfinancial firms.  We also control for the degree of state-ownership of 
commercial banks.  At the bank-specific level, we control for bank size, the liquidity of bank 
assets, bank equity relative to its assets, the degree to which the bank raises income through fees 
and commissions, the standard deviation of each bank’s return on assets, and the market share of 
each bank.  Although the relationships between bank margins and these bank-specific variables 
are independently informative as we discuss below, our focus is on the impact of bank 
regulations, concentration, and national institutions on bank margins.  Thus, we primarily use 
these bank-specific variables to control for country-level and bank-level differences that might 
confound the inferences that we draw on bank regulations, concentration, and national 
institutions.   
To examine bank regulations, we exploit Barth, Caprio, and Levine’s (2001b, 2003) new 
database.  We focus on regulations concerning bank entry, reserve requirements, restrictions on 
bank activities, and an overall index of regulatory restrictions on banks.  Thus, we use an 
assortment of information on the degree to which regulations may impede bank operations and 
competition.   
  3To study the impact of bank concentration on the cost of intermediation, we primarily use 
the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks.  We confirm our results using alternative 
measures of bank concentration.  If bank concentration reflects only regulatory restrictions on 
competition and our data fully measure regulatory restrictions, then any positive relationship 
between bank margins and concentration should vanish when controlling for regulatory 
restrictions.  If concentration reflects regulatory restrictions and efficient-structure forces, then 
we may actually find a negative coefficient on concentration after controlling for regulatory 
impediments to competition.   
We also analyze the impact of institutions on the cost of intermediation using indicators 
of property rights protection and the degree of economic freedom.  Controlling for institutions 
permits us to assess whether bank regulatory policies influence bank margins and overhead costs 
beyond broad national approaches to competition.  If bank regulatory policies reflect national 
approaches to competition in general and our data comprehensively measure institutions, then 
any association between regulations and the cost of intermediation should disappear when we 
control for the overall level of institutional development governing property rights and 
competition. 
To assess the robustness of the links between the cost of financial intermediation and 
regulations, market structure, and institutions, we control for various theories of the role of 
macroeconomic influences on bank margins and overhead expenditures.  Huybens and Smith 
(1999), for instance, stress that inflation exacerbates informational asymmetries and therefore 
leads to larger interest margins.  We examine this prediction.  Also, we control for the level of 
equity market development since competition from other segments of the financial system may 
influence the cost of intermediation.  Furthermore, since business-cycle fluctuations and 
  4government ownership of banks may influence the pricing of loans and deposits, we include 
GDP growth and the extent of state-ownership of banks in the analyses.   
There are at least three important reasons for examining a broad cross-section of 
countries in assessing the relationship between the cost of intermediation and bank regulations, 
bank concentration, and national institutions.  First, although past research focuses on the U.S., 
the U.S. banking industry is unrepresentative.  For example, the U.S. has over 23,000 banking 
institutions, which is large even compared to Japan (4,635), Germany (3,509), and France (547).
3  
Also, the U.S. has very developed financial, legal, and regulatory systems, few state-owned 
banks, and strong protection of private property, but these features do not hold in many 
countries.  Thus, it is important to look beyond the U.S. and to control for differences in 
institutional development in drawing inferences about the impact of banking structure and 
regulations on net interest margins.  Second, existing work focuses on concentration as a signal 
of competitiveness, but concentration per se is difficult to interpret.  Theory suggests that 
concentration reflects many factors, including regulatory restrictions on competition, efficient-
structure forces, and market power by banks.
4  By controlling for regulatory restrictions on bank 
competition, bank-specific characteristics, and the overall institutional environment, we narrow 
the range of factors for which concentration proxies.  This can only be done in a cross-country 
context.  Thus, while not fully resolving the interpretational problem with bank concentration, 
we obtain more informative measures of the impact of bank concentration on net interest margins 
                                                 
4 While a few influential papers examine the relationship between concentration and efficiency outside of the U.S., 
they do not control for cross-country differences in regulatory restrictions on bank competition.   
Similar to the U.S. studies, the non-U.S. studies also tend to produce ambiguous results on the concentration-
efficiency relationship (Goldberg and Rai, 1996; Lloyd-Williams, Moyneux, and Thornton, 1994).  Using cross-
country banking data, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) find little evidence that bank concentration has any 
effect on bank profitability or margins.  In a cross-country, cross-industry study Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) show 
that banking sector concentration exerts a depressing effect on overall economic growth, though it promotes the 
3 These statistics are for 1996 and are taken from Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999, Table 5). 
  5across countries.  Finally, although Jayaratne and Strahan (1996, 1998) and Stiroh and Strahan 
(2003) examine the impact of the deregulation of branching restrictions in the United States, we 
provide estimates of the impact of numerous regulations on bank efficiency across 72 countries 
while controlling for bank concentration, national economic and banking conditions, and cross-
country differences in a range of institutional features.   
Our research is related to an enormous literature on bank structure and efficiency.  We 
focus on a few key papers that motivate our approach and refer readers to more comprehensive 
reviews (Bank for International Settlements, 2001; Berger and Mester, 1997; Berger, Demsetz, 
and Strahan, 1999; Boyd and Graham, 1991, 1998; Group of Ten, 2001; and International 
Monetary Fund, 2001).  Most of the empirical evidence on banking structure and efficiency 
examines the U.S. banking industry, producing generally ambiguous results. Some evidence 
suggests that banks in highly concentrated local markets have larger overhead expenditures, 
charge higher rates on loans, pay lower rates on deposits, and are slower to reduce rates in 
response to Federal Reserve reductions in interest rates than banks in less concentrated markets 
(Berger and Hannan, 1989, 1998; Hannan and Berger, 1991; and Neumark and Sharpe, 1992).  
Others disagree.  Smirlock (1985) and Graddy and Kyle (1979) find that interest rate spreads are 
narrower in concentrated banking systems, while Whitehead (1977, 1978) and Keeley and 
Zimmerman (1985) report more mixed results.  Although Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell 
(1998) find that the best performing banks are generally not located in highly concentrated 
markets and Rajan and Peterson (1995) find that firms are less credit constrained in more 
concentrated banking markets, other researchers do not find unambiguous evidence that mergers 
and acquisitions that increase bank concentration systematically lower deposit rates and increase 
                                                                                                                                                             
growth of industries that depend heavily on external finance.  See Claessens and Laeven (2004) on the factors 
driving cross-country differences in bank competition. 
  6bank profitability (Prager and Hannan, 1999; Simons and Stavins, 1998; Berger and Humphrey, 
1992; Pilloff, 1996; and Petersen and Rajan, 1994).  Berger (1995) concludes that the 
relationship between bank concentration and efficiency in the United States depends critically on 
what other factors are held constant (Berger, Hunter, and Timme, 1993; Boyd and Runkle, 1993; 
Clark, 1988; Berger and Mester, 1997; Radecki et al., 1997; Vives, 2001; Hughes et al., 1999; 
and Berger et al., 2000).  We contribute to this work by extending the analysis to a large number 
of countries and controlling for cross-country differences in institutional development and 
regulatory policies.
5 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the econometric methodology.  
Section 3 discusses the data.  Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Methodology 
To assess the impact of bank regulations, banking sector concentration, and institutional 
development on bank efficiency while controlling bank-specific characteristics and the 
macroeconomic and financial environment, we estimate regressions of the following form: 
Net Interest Margini,k = α + β1Ci + β2Bi,k + β3Ri + β4Mi + β5Ii + εi,k  (1) 
Where i indexes country i, and k indexes bank k; Ci is a measure of bank concentration in 
country i; Bi, k is a vector of bank-specific characteristics for bank k in country i;  Ri is a vector of 
                                                 
5 Existing research on economics of scope and scale also focuses on the U.S. banking industry and generally does 
not find large cost savings or efficiency gains from consolidation (Berger et al., 1987; Ferrier et al., 1993; Rhoades, 
1993, 1998; Peristiani, 1997).  Indeed, researchers find that the cost curve facing U.S. banks is very flat, with 
estimates of scale-efficient size as low as $100 million of assets (Berger and Humphrey, 1991; Boyd and Runkle, 
1993; Clark, 1996; Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan, 1999).  We do not estimate a cost curve for banks.  In examining 
the determinants of net margins, however, we do examine bank size while controlling for the independent effects of 
bank regulations, bank concentration, the macroeconomic environment, institutional development, and other bank 
specific traits. 
  7regulatory restrictions on banks;  Mi is a vector of macroeconomic and financial system control 
variables;   
Ii is a vector of institutional development indicators; and εi,k is the residual.  As stressed above, 
we examine overhead expenditures instead of net interest margins in robustness checks.  We 
obtain extraordinarily consistent results using overhead expenditures and report the only 
discrepancy below. 
Since the model includes country-specific variables, we use a generalized least squares 
estimator with random effects.  The random effects specification is supported by the Breusch and 
Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier test which strongly rejects the null hypothesis that errors are 
independent within countries. 
To conduct the analyses, we need measures of (1) net interest margins, (2) bank 
concentration, (3) bank-specific characteristics that may influence interest margins, (4) 
regulatory policies, (5) cross-country differences in the macroeconomic environment and the 
level of stock market development, and (6) cross-country differences in the level of institutional 
development, e.g., the degree to which broad, national institutions support private property rights 
and promote economic openness and competition in general. 
3. Data   
We use two main data sources.  Bank-level information from 72 countries on over 1400 
banks is from the BankScope database provided by Fitch-IBCA.  The BankScope database has 
comprehensive coverage in most countries, accounting for over 90 percent of all banking assets.  
As specified in more detail below, we use data over the 1995-1999 period.  One advantage of 
using data averaged over the 1995-99 period is that we smooth variables that vary over time.  
Information on commercial bank regulations is obtained from the Barth, Caprio and Levine 
  8(2001b, 2003) database.  Since the regulatory data are for commercial banks, we use bank-level 
data on commercial banks from the BankScope database.  Also, focusing on commercial banks 
enhances the comparability of banks in our sample since some countries have banks that are not 
classified as commercial banks.  Details of sources and variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix. 
3.1 Net  Interest  Margin 
Net interest margin equals interest income minus interest expense divided by interest-
bearing assets and is average over 1995-1999.  The net interest margins measures the gap 
between what the bank pays the providers of funds and what the bank gets from firms and other 
users of bank credit.  Since the net interest margin focuses on the conventional borrowing and 
lending operations of the bank, we normalize by interest-bearing assets rather than total bank 
assets.  Table 1 shows that Belarus, Burundi, Ghana, and Moldova are notable for their margins 
of over 10 percent, whereas countries like Switzerland and Netherlands have very low margins 
of less than two percent.   
We use a variety of control variables and sensitivity checks to mitigate problems with 
interpreting the net interest margin variable.  We want to hold a sufficient amount constant such 
that we can interpret greater net interest values as reflecting either operational inefficiency or 
market power.  Confounding issues arise, however.  For instance, banks engaging in fee income 
generating activities may have different net interest margins because of cross-subsidization of 
activities.  For example, commercial banks may reduce lending rates to borrowers that also use 
bank services that generate fee and commission income, such as underwriting of securities and 
consulting advice on mergers and acquisitions.  In this case, cross-bank differences in net interest 
margins may reflect difference in bank activity, rather than differences in efficiency or 
  9competition.  Also, bank inefficiencies and market conditions may yield high overhead costs 
rather than large interest margins. Thus, cross-bank differences in net margins may reflect 
choices regarding whether to enjoy high overhead costs or large margins rather than reflecting 
differences in efficiency and competition.  Furthermore, bank margins may reflect different asset 
allocations and risk tastes of firms.  These measurement and interpretational issues emphasize 
the need to control for bank specific characteristics, conduct an array of sensitivity checks, and to 
use alternative measures of bank efficiency/performance.
6  As discussed above, we confirm the 
results using overhead expenditures as an alternative dependent variable, which we define below.  
3.2 Concentration 
Bank concentration equals the fraction of bank assets held by the three largest 
commercial banks in the country and is averaged over 1995-99.  Bank concentration is computed 
using bank-level data from the BankScope database.  Table 1 shows that concentration is quite 
different across countries.  It ranges from a low of 20 percent for the U.S. to 100 percent in 
Burundi and Rwanda.  But high concentration is not only a developing country phenomenon.  
Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Switzerland have concentration levels over 70 percent.  
For robustness, we confirm this paper’s results using alternative bank concentration measures 
that we discuss below.   
3.3  Bank-specific Control Variables 
We control for bank-specific traits.  We use 1995 values to reduce potential simultaneity 
with interest margins, which is computed over the period 1995-1999.  The results, however, do 
                                                 
6 Studies in the United States focusing on the efficiency-structure relationship have used price data from extensive 
surveys conducted by the Federal Reserve System.  See for example Berger and Hannan (1989). In these studies, 
banks are assumed to be more efficient if they set prices that are more favorable to customers (higher deposit rates, 
lower loan rates); in other words if they have lower ex-ante margins.  Such data are not available on a cross-country 
basis. 
  10not change when using bank-specific control variables averaged over the 1995-99.  Moreover, 
we obtain the same results on the country-specific variables when we omit the bank-specific 
variables altogether.  Thus, endogeneity problems from the bank-specific variables are not 
biasing the conclusions on our variables of focus: bank regulations, bank concentration, and 
institutional development. 
Bank size equals the logarithm of total bank assets in millions of US dollars.  Size may be 
an important determinant of net interest margins if there are increasing returns to scale in 
banking.  As emphasized in the Introduction, however, we do not estimate cost functions for 
each of the banks in our sample, so we do not explore the issue of increasing returns in detail.  
Rather, we focus on the regulatory, concentration, and institutional determinants of net interest 
margins while controlling for bank size.  Table 1 indicates considerable cross-country variability 
in the average size of banks.   
Bank equity equals the book value of equity divided by total assets.  Some theories 
suggest that well-capitalized banks face lower expected bankruptcy costs and hence lower 
funding costs.  According to this view, higher bank equity ratios imply larger net interest 
margins when loan rates do not vary much with bank equity.
7   
Fee income equals non-interest-operating income divided by total assets.  Banks have 
different product mixes.  These differences may influence the pricing of loan products.  Some, 
for instance, argue that well-developed fee income sources will produce lower interest margins 
                                                 
7 Table 1 suggests that there is quite a bit of variation in bank capitalization despite international capital adequacy 
requirements.  Banks in Japan, Finland, Rwanda, and Korea have very low capital ratios of less than five percent.  
Banks in Mexico appear to be very highly capitalized with ratios of over 20 percent.  Such a wide variance in figures 
raises the question whether the data are comparable across countries. BankScope organizes the accounting data so as 
to be comparable internationally. However, differences in accounting conventions regarding the valuation of assets, 
loan loss provisioning, hidden reserves and other problems remain.  For example, although efforts were made to use 
a consistent definition of equity, the observed variation may still to a certain extent reflect differences in what is 
considered capital in different countries.  Thus, we conducted the analyses both with and without bank equity in the 
regressions and found very similar results to those reported below. 
  11due to cross-subsidization of bank activities.  Thus, we control for fee income in assessing the 
impact of bank regulations, bank concentration, and national institutions on bank margins. 
Liquidity equals the liquid assets of the bank divided by total assets.  We use this 
indicator to control for differences in bank assets.  Banks with high levels of liquid assets in cash 
and government securities may receive lower interest income than banks with less liquid assets.  
If the market for deposits is reasonably competitive, then greater liquidity will tend to be 
negatively associated with interest margins. 
Bank risk equals the standard deviation of the rate of return on bank assets over the 
period 1995-99.  Some hold that banks operating in more risky environment will tend toward an 
equilibrium characterized by a high net interest margin to compensate for this risk.  Thus, to 
assess the independent effect of regulations, bank concentration, and institutions on bank 
margins, we present regressions controlling for individual bank risk. 
Overhead equals overhead costs divided by total assets. We use this to capture cross-bank 
differences in the organization and operation of the bank.  Different organizations will choose 
different business systems, product mixes, and asset allocations with consequently different 
overhead cost structures.  Also, cost inefficiencies or low levels of market competition may be 
reflected in high overhead costs.  Given that overhead may measure cost inefficiency and market 
competition, we first conduct the analyses excluding overhead as a regressor.  Then, we use 
overhead as an alternative measure of bank efficiency/performance, i.e., as the dependent 
variable (using overhead averaged over the 1995-1999 period).  Finally, we include overhead (in 
1995) as a control variable.  These different analyses confirm the paper’s conclusions. 
Market share equals the bank’s assets divided by total commercial bank assets in the 
economy.  A bank that dominates the national market may enjoy a larger net interest income than 
  12a bank that does not control much of the market even after controlling for bank size.  In other 
words, a bank with a large market share may exert market power to enjoy a higher net interest 
margin. Note this is different from concentration.  Concentration is not computed at the bank-
level; it is a national characteristic.  Clearly, there is a relationship.  In the case of a country with 
a single bank, market share and concentration will both equal one.  Just as clearly, however, 
there can be concentrated banking systems in which many banks do not have much market share.  
Indeed, although the Market share and Bank concentration variables are significantly correlated, 
the correlation coefficient is quite low (0.12).  We conduct the bulk of the analysis without 
market share and then show that the results are robust to its inclusion. 
3.4 Regulatory  Variables 
Fraction of entry denied equals the fraction of entry applications denied.  From Table 2 
we see that this figure is particularly high for countries such as Bangladesh, Egypt, Ghana, 
Kenya, and Thailand.  On the other extreme, many countries including Germany, Switzerland 
and the United States have granted licenses to all applicants. One problem with this measure is 
that in the absence of applications – which may itself indicate the presence of insurmountable 
entry barriers – this variable is not defined.  However, when we replace the missing values with 
ones in those countries that received zero entry application, we obtain very similar results to 
those reported below.  Also, we found similar results when we separately examine the fraction of 
entry denied for domestic and foreign applicants respectively.
8   
                                                 
8 We also examined Foreign ownership, which equals the proportion of banking assets held in foreign-controlled 
banks – defined as 50 percent or more foreign-owned. Table 2 shows that there is a wide variation in foreign 
ownership in the sample.  In Ghana, Hungary, and Jordan, foreign owned banks represent greater than 50 percent of 
the banking system. At the other extreme, India, Rep. of Korea, and Nigeria have negligible foreign ownership.  
While we find a close relationship between net interest margins and restrictions on bank entry, we do not find that 
foreign ownership per se is important for accounting for interest margins.  See, Levine (2003) for more on the 
impact of foreign banks. 
  13Activity restrictions is an indicator of the degree to which banks face regulatory 
restrictions on their activities in securities markets, insurance, real-estate, and owning shares in 
non-financial firms.  Activity restrictions may also have an important impact on bank efficiency 
by reducing competition and limiting economies of scope (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2001a;b; 
2003).  The indicator potentially ranges from 0 to 4, where higher values indicate greater 
restrictions.   Indonesia and Japan have severe restrictions on bank activity, with values of 3.75 
and 3.5 respectively.  Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland do not impose 
many restrictions on bank activities (Activity restrictions equals 1.25).  In our sample, banks 
differ substantially in their ability to engage in different activities as noted in Tables 2 and 3.   
Reserve requirements takes on the value one if there are reserve or liquidity requirements 
and zero otherwise. Table 2 shows that about a quarter of the countries in the sample have no 
reserve requirements.  To the extent that reserve holdings are not remunerated or remunerated at 
less-than-market rates, these regulations impose a tax on the bank. Thus, we assess whether 
reserve requirements influence bank net interest margins.
9 
Banking freedom is an overall indicator of banking freedom that ranges from 1 to 5.  
Larger values signify more freedom.  This variable comes from the Economic Freedom Index of 
the Heritage Foundation and is designed to provide an overall measure of the openness of the 
banking industry and the extent to which banks are free to operate their businesses.  Since it may 
be difficult to identify a single, key regulation that explains net interest margins, we also 
examine this overall index of bank freedom. 
3.5  Macroeconomic and Financial System Control Variables 
Table 2 reports the economic and financial system control variables.  
  14Inflation equals the annual rate of the change in CPI index. Boyd, Levine and Smith 
(2001) show that countries with high inflation have underdeveloped financial systems and banks.  
Huybens and Smith (1999) develop a theoretical model in which interest margins tend to rise in 
the presence of inflation.  Thus, we control for inflation in our analyses. 
GDP growth equals the rate of real per capita GDP growth.  If investment opportunities 
in an economy are correlated with the business cycle, there may exist a positive relationship 
between business opportunities for banks and the growth rate of the economy. 
Total value traded equals the trading of domestic equities on domestic exchanges as a 
share of GDP.  We include this measure of stock market development (Levine and Zervos, 1998) 
because countries with better functioning markets may create a competitive environment that 
puts downward pressure on bank interest margins. 
State ownership equals the share of banking system assets that are in state-owned banks, 
where state-owned is defined as 50 percent or more state-ownership.  This measures government 
involvement in the banking industry.  Banking systems dominated by state-banks tend to be 
inefficient and less open to entry.  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) find that the 
extent of state ownership of a country’s banking system is an indicator of the banking system’s 
efficiency in financing the private sector.   Banking systems dominated by state-banks are also 
more likely to face restrictions on their activities.  In our sample, Bangladesh, Belarus, Burundi, 
Egypt, India, Romania and Russia have banking systems where state-owned banks account for 
more than 60 percent of the market. 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 We also examine the stringency of capital requirements as computed by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2003).  The 
capital stringency index, however, did not robustly enter the net interest margins regression significantly. 
  153.6  Institutional Impediments to Competition 
Besides examining specific regulatory restrictions on competition and the impact of bank 
concentration on net interest margins, we also consider three indexes of the overall institutional 
environment.  In particular, we assess whether bank regulation and concentration influences bank 
interest margins beyond the overall institutional structure of the economy.   
Property rights is an indicator of the protection of private property rights.  It ranges from 
1 to 5.  Higher values signify greater protection of private property rights.  There are some 
countries that do a poor job of protecting private property rights.  Rwanda’s Property Rights 
index equals one, while it equals two for Bangladesh, Burundi and Romania.  While a large 
number of countries have Property Rights index values of five. 
KKZ Institution index is an aggregate index of the level of institutional development.  
Kaufman, Kraay, and Zoido-Loboton (2001) compile information on (i) voice and 
accountability, i.e., the extent to which citizens can choose their government and enjoy political 
rights, civil liberties, and an independent press, (ii) political stability, i.e., a low likelihood that 
the government will be overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, (iii) government 
effectiveness, i.e., the quality of public service delivery, competence of civil servants, and the 
absence of politicization of the civil service, (iv) light regulatory burden, i.e., relative absence of 
government controls on goods markets, government interference in the banking system, 
excessive bureaucratic controls on starting new businesses, or excessive regulation of private 
business and international trade, (v) rule of law, i.e., protection of persons and property against 
violence or theft, independent and effective judges, contract enforcement, (vi) freedom from 
graft – absence of the use of public power for private gain, corruption. 
  16Economic freedom equals an overall index of economic freedom.  It measures the extent 
to which individuals and firms feel free to conduct their businesses.  Since Economic freedom 
and the KKZ Institution index explicitly include information on the freedom to conduct banking 
operations, we do not include the indexes and the bank regulation variables simultaneously in the 
analyses.  Including Economic freedom and the KKZ Institution index simultaneously with the 
regulatory variables, however, confirms the results below. Economic freedom ranges in value 
from 1 to 5, with greater values signifying better protection of freedoms.  The United Kingdom, 
the United States, and Switzerland have indexes of greater than 4.05.  Burundi and Rwanda have 
Economic Freedom indexes of less than 1.9.   
GDP per capita equals real per capita GDP expressed in thousands of 1995 US dollars.  
Since it is very difficult to define and measure the important features of well-functioning 
institutions, we also use GDP per capita as a general indicator of institutional development.  
Table 2 provides data on GDP per capita. 
A broad set of research suggests that better institutions will promote greater competition 
throughout the economy.  This work predicts that better institutions will negatively influence net 
interest margins (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Acemoglu, et al., 2001; Easterly and Levine, 
2003).  However, Bianco, Jappelli, and Pagano’s (2001) research indicates that the impact of 
overall institutional quality on net interest margins is theoretically ambiguous.  On the one hand, 
improvements in the institutional environment (encompassing better property rights, stronger 
contract enforcement, and a higher level judicial efficiency) increase the value of collateral for 
bank loans and therefore reduce the cost of financial intermediation for existing borrowers.  On 
the other hand, such improvements can extend the credit market to low-grade borrowers and 
thereby raise the average interest rate paid on loans.  As a result, the impact of better institutions 
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institutional development on net interest margins. 
3.7 Summary  Statistics 
The Table 3 correlations highlight key relationships.  The results indicate that tighter 
regulatory restrictions (more Fraction entry denied, more Activity restrictions, less Banking 
freedom) and higher levels of bank concentration are associated with bigger net interest margins.  
Furthermore, the correlations show that better institutions (Property rights protection, KKZ 
Institution index, Economic freedom) are negatively correlated with bank interest margins and 
negatively associated with regulatory restrictions.  Furthermore, macroeconomic instability, as 
proxied by inflation, is positively associated with net interest margins, while greater stock market 
development (Value traded) is negatively linked with bank interest margins.  The correlations 
among these national characteristics suggest that it is important to control for a range of factors 
in assessing the impact of any of these country traits on the cost of financial intermediation. 
Moving beyond correlations, we now examine the relationship between net interest 
margins and bank regulations, bank concentration, and the institutional environment while 
controlling for bank-specific characteristics and the macroeconomic and financial environment. 
4. The  Results 
4.1 Bank-specific  Effects and Concentration 
Table 4 presents regressions of net interest margin on bank specific variables, bank 
concentration, and the regulatory variables.  Depending on data availability for the regulatory 
variables, there are between 55 and 71 countries and between 1217 and 1372 banks.  The table 
provides within-country and between-country R
2’s for each regression. 
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interest margins than small banks.  This is consistent with models that emphasize the positive 
role of size arising from scale efficiency.  Banks that hold a high fraction of liquid assets have 
lower net interest margins.  This is consistent with banks receiving lower returns on holding cash 
or securities, but facing a competitive market for deposits.  Highly capitalized banks have higher 
margins, which is consistent with theories stressing that highly capitalized banks can charge 
more for loans and/or pay less on deposits because they face lower bankruptcy risks.  Finally, 
banks engaging in fee-based activities tend to have lower margins, consistent with – though not 
direct evidence of – cross-subsidization of bank activities.  
Now, consider concentration.  As shown in Table 4, bank concentration enters positively 
and significantly at the five-percent level in all of the regressions.  While the impact of 
concentration on net interest margins is not inconsequential, the economic magnitude is not 
huge.  For instance if Romania were to change from its very highly concentrated banking 
structure (Bank concentration = 0.78) to the level in Poland (0.57), this would represent a one-
standard deviation change in bank concentration.  If we use the coefficient from regression 2 
(2.3), Romania’s reduction in bank concentration would translate into a reduction in its net 
interest margin from 8.45 to 7.97, which is a bit less than one-fourth of a standard deviation drop 
in the net interest margin.  The economic effect of concentration is further illustrated by 
comparing Burundi and Kenya.  Burundi’s level of bank concentration is 1, i.e., the three largest 
commercial banks fully account for the banking system in Burundi.  If it had the level of bank 
concentration in Kenya (0.57), this would involve a two-standard deviation reduction in bank 
concentration.  Again using the coefficient from regression 2, Burundi’s two-standard deviation 
reduction in bank concentration would translate into a reduction in its net interest margin from 
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gap with Kenya’s net interest margin (7.46). 
4.2 Regulatory  Restrictions 
Table 4 also evaluates the impact of regulatory variables on net interest margins.  We 
include (1) Fraction of entry denied, (2) Activity restrictions, (3) Reserve requirements, and (4) 
Banking freedom one-at-a-time while controlling for Bank concentration and the bank-specific 
factors. 
The Table 4 results clearly indicate that regulatory restrictions substantively increase net 
interest margins. First, in countries that deny a higher fraction of bank entry applications, 
margins are larger.  This is consistent with the view that restricting entry protects existing banks 
and allows them to enjoy large interest margins.  Note this is the only finding that differs when 
using overhead expenditures instead of net interest margins as the dependent variable.  With 
overhead expenditures as the dependent variable, the restricting entry index does not enter 
significantly at the 0.05 level.   
The Table 4 regressions also indicate that, in countries that restrict banks from engaging 
in non-traditional activities, such as securities underwriting, real estate, owning non-financial 
firms, and insurance, margins tend to be larger.  The economic size of the effect is substantial.  
For instance, if Mexico had the same level of restrictions on activities as Korea (2.25 instead of 
3), this one-standard deviation drop in Activity restrictions would induce a full percentage point 
drop in net interest margins in Mexico according to regression 2 in Table 4 (0.75*1.4).  Thus, a 
one-standard deviation drop in Activity restrictions translates into 0.6 of a standard deviation 
drop in the net interest margin.  Third, consistent with some theories, reserve requirements tend 
to boost net interest margins.  This relationship is not very strong, however; the coefficient is 
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business in general are associated with higher banking margins.  In sum, regulatory restrictions 
tend to boost interest margins. 
4.3  The Macroeconomic and Financial Sector Environment 
Tables 5 and 6 examine the relationship between net interest margin, bank concentration, 
bank-specific traits, and selected features of the macroeconomic and financial sector 
environment.  We do this both to study the relationship between net interest margins and these 
macroeconomic and financial sector controls and to assess the robustness of the findings on bank 
concentration and the bank-specific features to controlling for national characteristics.  Table 5 
reports results without the regulatory variables.  Table 6 adds the regulatory variables. 
The macroeconomic and financial features help explain cross-bank net interest margins 
(Table 5).  First, higher inflation rates are positively associated with net interest margins.  
According to the estimates, a one-standard deviation increase in the rate of inflation (i.e., an 
increase in the inflation rate of nine percentage points) induces a boost in the net interest margin 
of 0.36 of a percentage point (9*0.04).  Thus, while significant, inflation’s impact on net interest 
margins is not economically huge.  Second, the regression results indicate that economic growth 
is negatively associated with net interest margins using a 10 percent significance level, so that 
economic growth is weakly associated with a drop in margins.  Third, we also examine whether 
other segments of the financial sector influence bank margins.  Total value traded enters 
negatively and significantly in regression (3) of Table 5.  The coefficient estimate suggests that a 
one standard deviation increase in total value traded will reduce net interest margins by almost a 
full percentage point (2.8*0.35), which is about one-half of a standard deviation drop in net 
interest margins.  More concretely, the estimates suggest that if Mexico had the same level of 
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the difference in the net interest rate margin between the United States (4.3) and Mexico (5.7).  
Fourth, we also observe that the degree of state ownership of the banking industry is positively 
linked with net interest margins. 
In Table 5, we also include all the macroeconomic and financial sector indicators 
simultaneously with bank concentration and bank-specific controls.  The data indicate that 
inflation retains a strong, positive independent relationship with net interest margins while 
controlling for the other macroeconomic variables.  The other macroeconomic and financial 
controls, however, are no longer significantly correlated with net interest margins at the five 
percent significance level.  The broad measures of macroeconomic and financial conditions are 
highly correlated with each other (Table 3).  Finally, note that the Table 5 results on the bank 
specific variables and Bank concentration are very similar to the Table 4 results when we control 
for the regulatory environment. 
4.4  Regulatory Environment, plus Controlling for Inflation 
Next we examine the impact of bank regulations and bank concentration on net interest 
margins while controlling for bank characteristics and inflation (Table 6).  We report the results 
while controlling for only the inflation rate and not the other macroeconomic and financial sector 
features because (i) theory suggests that inflation influences interest margins, (ii) inflation 
remained significantly associated with the net interest margin when including additional 
macroeconomic and financial controls in Table 5, (iii) the macroeconomic/financial variables are 
highly correlated (Table 3), and (iv) we obtain the same results when using the other 
macroeconomic/financial controls.  Finally, note that inflation is positive and significant across 
the different specifications in Table 6. 
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when controlling for macroeconomic conditions.  When controlling for inflation, Fraction of 
entry denied and Activity remain significantly positively correlated with net interest margin.  
Banking freedom enters with a significantly negative coefficient.   
Furthermore, note that the relationship between net interest margins and bank 
concentration virtually vanishes when including inflation and the regulatory environment.  When 
controlling for either Activity restrictions, Reserve requirements, or Banking freedom, 
concentration enters significantly only at the 10 percent level and concentration enters 
insignificantly when controlling for the Fraction of entry denied.  Also, note that concentration 
never enters negatively and significantly.  Thus, the results do not provide supportive evidence 
for theories stressing that a few, highly efficient banks will dominate the market, leading to a 
negative associate between concentration and efficiency when controlling for impediments to 
competition.  These results do not reject that the hypothesis that there are economic forces at 
play that induce more efficient banks to capture greater market share.  Rather, this paper’s more 
limited conclusion is that after we control for macroeconomic stability and include proxy 
measures – albeit imperfect measures-- of regulatory impediments to competition, concentration 
is unrelated to bank net interest margins at the 0.05 significance level. 
4.5 Institutional  Setting 
In Table 7 we examine the impact of the institutional setting on bank net interest margins 
when controlling for Bank concentration, inflation, and bank-specific controls.  Then, in Table 8, 
we expand the analysis by also including regulatory restrictions. 
First, the results document a strong link between institutions – such as Economic 
freedom, Property rights protection, and the KKZ Institution index – and net interest margins 
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sector competition tend to have lower interest margins.  The results suggest that a one-standard 
deviation improvement in Economic freedom (0.54) would lower net interest margins by 1.1 
percentage point, which more than one-half of a standard deviation.  Put differently, the 
coefficient estimates in Table 7 (regression 3) imply that if Mexico had the same level of 
Economic freedom as the United States (4.2 instead of 2.9), this would more than eliminate the 
net interest difference of the two countries by bringing Mexico’s net interest margin of 5.7 down 
below the U.S. level of 4.3.  Thus, the overall institutional environment is importantly linked 
with net interest margins. 
Second, after controlling for the institutional environment, Bank concentration no longer 
enters significantly even at the 0.10 significance level (Tables 6, 7, 8).  While concentration 
remained significantly associated with net interest margins at the 0.10 when controlling for 
regulatory restrictions (Table 6), Tables 7 and 8 show that concentration enters insignificantly 
when controlling for overall institutional development. 
Third, when we include concentration, bank-specific controls, inflation, regulatory 
restrictions, and Property rights simultaneously, we find that (1) Property rights matter for 
explaining net interest margins, (2) regulatory restrictions do not provide additional explanatory 
power, (3) inflation remains significantly positively associated with net interest margins, and (6) 
the remaining bank-specific controls remain significant as discussed above.  As noted, we do not 
include the other institutional indicators in Table 8 because the KKZ Institution index and 
Economic freedom measure include information on bank regulations.  This would bias the results 
against finding a significant coefficient on the regulatory restriction measures.  Indeed, we get 
the same results when including the KKZ Institution index and Economic freedom measure.  
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index, this suggests that bank regulations reflect something broader about the competitive 
environment. 
We interpret these results as suggesting that there are broad national approaches to 
competition and property rights that help explain economic efficiency throughout the economy, 
including the banking industry.  Once we account for these broad institutions, bank specific 
regulations and bank competition have no additional explanatory power. 
4.6 Robustness 
We have conducted a large number of sensitivity analyses.  Many of these have already 
been mentioned.  Here we mention some additional checks. 
First, we confirm the results using three alternative measures of bank concentration 
(Table 9).  The three measures are as follows.  Bank concentration (Top-5) equals the fraction of 
commercial bank assets held by the five largest commercial banks in the country.  This measure 
differs from our basic measure of bank concentration by taking the share of the five rather than 
three largest banks.  Bank concentration (All) equals the fraction of bank assets held by the three 
largest banks in the country.  This measure differs form our basic measure of bank concentration 
by using data on not only commercial banks, but also on savings banks, cooperative banks, and 
non-bank credit institutions to calculate the concentration ratio.  Finally, Bank concentration 
(Deposits) equals the share in total deposits of the deposits of the five largest banks in the 
country. Unlike the other three concentration measures, this measure is not constructed using 
Bankscope data, but is taken from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001b, 2003). This indicator is 
based on bank deposits rather than assets, and is constructed from a survey of bank regulatory 
and supervisory authorities in the respective countries.  While the survey measure does not suffer 
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different definitions used across the different countries and might therefore be subject to 
measurement error.  The survey was undertaken in 1999.  The Bankscope measures of 
concentration are calculated as averages over the period 1995 to 1999.  
The correlation coefficients between the different concentration measures are high and 
significant at the one percent level (the correlation at the country level with Bank concentration 
is 0.97 for Bank concentration (Top-5), 0.97 for the Bank concentration (All), and 0.85 for the 
Bank concentration (Deposits)).  Tables 1 and 3 also provide summary statistics on these 
alternative measures.  Table 9 indicates the consistency of the results using these different 
concentration measures. 
Second, we focused on countries with very high concentration levels.  Specifically, we 
created dummy variables for those countries with concentration values of greater than 80 
percent.  We then examined whether countries with these very high concentration levels were 
different, i.e., did very high concentration imply high net interest margins even when controlling 
for the institutional environment.  Again, we find that once we account for broad national 
institutions, bank concentration and a dummy variable that identifies highly concentrated 
systems have no additional explanatory power (Table 10). 
Third, as emphasized in the Introduction, we confirm the results using overhead 
expenditures as a share of bank assets as the dependent variable.  The Table 11 findings confirm 
this paper’s conclusions. Bank concentration and regulatory restrictions do not help explain 
cross-bank differences in overhead costs when controlling for the overall level of institutional 
development. 
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that assume different levels of risk may charge different interest rates, we control for the standard 
deviation of the return on assets of each bank.  As show in Table 12, this does not alter our 
findings.  We further extended the analyses in Table 12 by controlling for bank profits as 
measured by return on assets.  Again, controlling for bank risk and return on assets did not 
change the results. 
Fifth, Table 13 presents pure cross-country comparisons by averaging across the banks in 
each country.  Thus, we use one observation per country and do not control for any bank-specific 
factors.  The dependent variable is the average net interest margin across the banks in a particular 
country.  These regressions eliminate the bank-specific information.  Thus, if bank-specific 
endogeneity is driving the early results, then removing bank specific-effects should reverse the 
findings.  That is not the case.  As show, bank concentration is unconditionally positively 
associated with net interest margins.  Furthermore, activity restrictions and banking freedom are 
very closely linked with net interest margins even when controlling for inflation and bank 
concentration.  Moreover, bank concentration and regulatory restrictions become insignificant 
when we control for Property rights.  Thus, the pure cross-country results confirm this paper’s 
bank-level analyses. 
Sixth, we also examine market share (Table 14).  Unlike concentration, market share is a 
bank specific variable that measures the relative size of the individual bank.  We again confirm 
the paper’s findings.  When controlling for market share, we find that regulatory restrictions on 
bank activity tends to boost net interest margins when also conditioning on bank concentration 
and other bank-specific factors.   
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that banks that are relatively large compared to the market can exert market power to increase 
rents.  Furthermore, when adding institutional development to the analysis, we again find that 
Property rights lowers net interest margins and the regulatory variables no longer enter 
significantly.  Throughout the analysis, market share enters positively and significantly.  When 
individual banks enjoy market power, they charge higher net interest margins even after 
controlling for other bank specific traits, overall market concentration, regulatory restrictions on 
banks, and overall level of institutional development. 
Seventh, we confirm that the results hold when using bank-specific factors averaged over 
the 1995-99 period rather than using the initial values of the bank-specific variables (not 
reported). 
Finally, we confirm this paper’s results using alternative samples.  We have re-done the 
analyses, for instance, omitting Latin American countries, Sub-Saharan African economies, or 
the United States.  We obtain the same results.  Furthermore, we confirm this paper’s results 
when excluding very small countries (e.g., countries with populations of less than one million 
people).  Similarly, for some countries, especially those with highly concentrated banking 
systems, we only have data on three or fewer banks.  The results are unchanged when restricting 
the sample to countries for which we have data on four or more banks (not reported). 
5. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the impact of bank regulations, concentration, and institutions on 
bank net interest margins and overhead expenditures using bank level data across 72 countries 
while controlling for a wide array of macroeconomic, financial, and bank specific-traits.  In 
summary, we emphasize four findings. 
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variation in financial intermediary costs.  High net interest margins and large overhead 
expenditures tend to be associated with small banks, banks that hold a low fraction of liquid 
assets, banks that hold a relatively low amount of capital, banks without substantial income from 
fee-based activities, and banks with a large market share.  The latter finding is consistent with the 
view that banks that are relatively large compared to the market can exert market power to 
increase rents. 
Second, bank regulations help explain the cost of financial intermediation.  Tighter 
regulations on bank entry, restrictions on bank activities, and regulations that inhibit the freedom 
of bankers to conduct their business boost bank net interest margins.  These results hold when 
controlling for banking sector concentration, bank-specific characteristics, and the rate of 
inflation.  Furthermore, complimentary research does not find countervailing benefits from 
regulatory restrictions on bank entry, activities, or freedom in terms of (a) bank stability, (b) 
firms’ access to external finance, (c) bank valuations, or (d) overall financial development (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2003a,b; Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2003; Caprio, Laeven, and 
Levine, 2003). 
Third, there is an important caveat to the finding that bank regulations explain net interest 
margins and overhead expenditures: bank regulations cannot be viewed in isolation from the 
overall institutional framework.  Bank regulations reflect broader, national institutions associated 
with the protection of private property rights and the freedom to compete in the economy.  Thus, 
when controlling for these broader, national institutions, bank regulations do not provide 
additional explanatory power of cross-bank net interest margins.  Institutional development, 
however, does explain cross-bank differences in net interest margins.  We do not interpret these 
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we interpret the findings as consistent with a strand of literature that emphasizes that policies and 
regulations stem from national institutions.  
Four, the evidence on the relationship between concentration and net interest margins is 
mixed, which is perhaps unsurprising given the conflicting predictions from theory.  When 
controlling for bank-specific factors, concentration is positively and significantly linked with 
bank net interest margins.  This relationship breaks down, however, when controlling for 
regulatory restrictions on banks and macroeconomic stability.  Given the availability of data on 
the macroeconomic environment and regulatory impediments on banks, these results shed 
skeptical light on using national bank concentration measures to proxy for the competitive 
environment facing the banking industry.  Furthermore, even when controlling for regulatory 
restrictions and the overall institutional environment, we never find a significant positive link 
between concentration and efficiency as predicted by some theories of banking. 
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2.16 0.44 0.58 0.45 0.38 6.62 16.09 7.73 1.55 2.51 1.15 0.71 22
Bahrain 2.45 0.92 0.98 0.91 0.71 7.06 11.82 14.67 1.62 1.93 16.46 0.40 6
Bangladesh 2.05 0.70 0.79 0.63 0.65 4.72 44.51 6.30 1.07 2.07 8.03 0.82 6
Belarus 10.68 0.84 0.96 0.81 0.83 5.18 37.29 1.12 0.45 5.82 18.43 2.70 1
Belgium 2.38 0.75 0.85 0.52 0.74 7.07 23.08 6.47 0.72 2.55 2.32 0.67 22
Bolivia 5.62 0.61 0.83 0.46 0.68 4.50 19.85 14.90 0.72 3.85 8.92 0.94 11
Botswana 7.03 0.92 1.00 0.90 1.00 5.48 11.46 10.44 1.44 4.31 25.00 0.87 4
Burundi 10.74 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.91 4.16 20.74 10.12 1.47 5.20 50.00 1.25 2
Canada 2.03 0.56 0.84 0.54 0.76 6.59 22.46 7.12 0.73 1.93 0.30 0.77 24
Chile 5.02 0.48 0.71 0.46 0.59 6.72 26.16 12.48 -0.53 3.04 6.91 0.68 14
Croatia 5.40 0.62 0.72 0.58 0.57 5.12 24.56 19.64 2.09 5.48 4.62 3.02 21
Cyprus 2.53 0.82 0.94 0.82 0.80 7.66 21.80 7.13 1.27 2.39 35.64 0.88 2
Czech Rep.  2.88 0.72 0.81 0.61 0.74 7.11 13.12 7.84 1.15 2.41 7.19 0.94 13
Denmark 5.28 0.71 0.80 0.66 0.79 5.98 19.58 10.78 0.41 3.87 1.91 0.39 46
Egypt 2.42 0.58 0.72 0.57 0.65 6.90 n.a. 7.74 1.47 1.89 2.44 0.47 3
Estonia 6.15 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.95 5.58 6.88 9.14 3.37 5.24 50.00 2.25 2
Finland 1.99 0.75 0.94 0.77 0.97 9.38 14.14 5.20 0.73 1.90 22.69 0.42 4
France 2.86 0.33 0.50 0.27 0.70 7.11 12.05 7.38 1.05 3.10 0.39 0.62 111
Germany 2.66 0.32 0.42 0.32 0.12 6.76 30.25 9.04 1.21 2.89 0.33 0.38 103
Ghana 11.61 0.79 0.98 0.75 0.78 5.52 49.18 11.59 5.62 7.68 30.97 1.05 2
Greece 3.50 0.71 0.88 0.68 0.70 8.04 32.16 6.15 1.49 3.22 11.11 0.95 9
Guatemala 7.53 0.26 0.40 0.26 0.38 4.50 23.72 10.33 -0.26 5.84 3.76 0.60 14
Honduras 8.82 0.42 0.64 0.41 0.52 4.71 32.68 9.76 -1.47 5.14 10.09 0.56 2
Hungary 4.86 0.53 0.67 0.51 n.a. 6.26 9.25 9.18 2.23 4.26 5.52 1.48 16
Iceland 4.15 0.87 0.96 0.73 n.a. 6.95 9.83 7.16 2.03 4.07 32.28 0.39 3
India 3.48 0.37 0.48 0.35 0.42 6.81 39.38 7.30 0.72 2.58 1.72 0.51 55
Indonesia 5.62 0.51 0.67 0.39 0.53 5.47 22.47 11.92 0.37 2.89 0.46 2.08 20
Ireland 3.49 0.68 0.79 0.62 n.a. 9.49 29.44 6.51 1.04 2.73 25.29 0.20 3
Israel 3.22 0.76 0.92 0.76 0.80 7.53 12.27 10.36 1.50 3.16 8.14 0.31 12
Italy 3.67 0.30 0.43 0.27 0.25 7.57 29.76 8.22 0.65 3.64 0.98 0.44 56
























































2.07 0.27 0.39 0.26 0.31 9.80 11.80 3.76 0.20 1.56 0.79 0.30 102
Jordan 3.47 0.89 0.96 0.89 0.68 6.86 41.29 7.95 0.46 2.61 16.43 0.47 6
Kenya 7.46 0.57 0.70 0.54 0.62 4.58 35.57 10.08 0.85 4.79 6.64 1.51 5
Korea, Rep.  2.39 0.37 0.55 0.30 0.48 9.69 11.03 5.84 0.41 2.66 5.77 1.69 15
Kuwait 1.87 0.68 0.91 0.67 n.a. 8.45 34.35 10.43 0.60 0.94 16.67 0.34 6
Latvia 6.92 0.53 0.69 0.49 n.a. 3.44 11.75 14.14 3.10 7.03 6.58 4.55 10
Lebanon 4.18 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.40 5.02 54.26 8.86 0.10 2.83 2.16 0.84 28
Lithuania 8.43 0.94 0.98 0.86 0.90 5.66 8.48 -0.77 0.54 6.73 97.80 1.89 1
Luxembourg 1.19 0.21 0.32 0.19 0.27 6.92 45.02 5.54 0.61 1.38 0.77 0.24 26
Macedonia 9.57 0.87 0.93 0.84 0.77 5.67 52.57 10.90 4.05 5.33 43.58 0.32 2
Malta 2.28 0.94 0.99 0.89 1.00 6.33 13.37 6.30 0.36 1.71 23.48 0.14 4
Mauritius 3.91 0.93 0.98 0.91 0.91 5.35 34.77 11.41 0.44 2.31 19.39 0.29 5
Mexico 5.70 0.64 0.79 0.63 0.80 4.38 38.26 31.84 -0.44 5.98 3.60 3.30 9
Moldova, Rep.  10.03 0.83 0.98 0.76 0.71 2.55 50.69 11.07 8.88 6.96 17.54 2.28 1
Morocco 5.01 0.77 0.96 0.61 0.75 7.82 28.60 10.36 0.38 2.09 16.72 0.10 2
Namibia 6.64 0.83 1.00 0.79 1.00 5.95 15.08 5.91 1.22 4.26 25.00 0.28 4
Nepal 5.41 0.77 0.92 0.77 0.55 4.39 37.21 8.08 1.34 2.45 25.00 0.55 4
Netherlands 1.97 0.81 0.91 0.77 0.88 7.51 34.01 6.83 0.89 1.95 3.56 0.23 18
New Zealand  3.03 0.70 0.95 0.66 0.91 8.53 9.08 6.09 1.10 2.49 18.92 0.14 5
Nigeria 8.94 0.62 0.71 0.50 0.51 6.31 64.46 7.60 3.35 7.79 11.50 0.96 8
Norway 2.68 0.61 0.70 0.52 n.a. 7.94 5.96 6.48 0.82 1.87 8.56 0.48 5
Panama 2.86 0.24 0.35 0.22 0.30 5.55 21.93 9.15 0.93 1.95 2.36 0.39 8
Peru 7.92 0.64 0.78 0.46 0.81 5.83 26.89 10.58 1.01 5.79 10.09 0.93 9
Philippines 4.56 0.40 0.57 0.36 0.46 7.19 26.37 14.41 1.03 3.61 5.26 0.99 19
Poland 6.81 0.57 0.69 0.51 0.57 5.63 13.08 14.65 -0.24 3.89 2.95 0.96 15
Romania 8.45 0.78 0.92 0.83 0.59 4.09 34.13 20.77 1.82 5.82 4.95 2.34 2
Russian Fed.  5.99 0.43 0.57 0.38 0.80 5.54 53.78 12.94 5.66 6.61 7.02 7.80 4
Rwanda 5.74 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 4.27 43.61 3.33 1.06 4.61 43.54 0.15 1
Singapore 2.86 0.85 0.95 0.60 n.a. 8.78 13.36 15.23 0.36 1.18 18.82 0.47 5
Slovenia 4.00 0.64 0.77 0.60 0.64 5.61 16.10 13.29 2.67 4.23 8.17 0.53 11
South Africa  6.22 0.78 0.92 0.67 0.85 6.05 19.37 14.30 1.19 4.90 8.31 0.68 11





























Spain 3.40 0.54 0.62 0.47 0.49 7.70 23.97 8.88 0.62 2.98 1.68 0.36 41





2.39 0.78 0.97 0.72 n.a. 10.11 50.37 7.32 0.94 2.29 14.68 1.20 5
Switzerland 1.75 0.77 0.84 0.74 0.65 6.02 25.82 12.99 1.77 2.41 0.82 0.35 85
Taiwan 2.42 0.31 0.45 0.33 0.15 8.91 13.25 9.09 -0.10 1.39 3.32 0.35 30
Thailand 2.30 0.66 0.82 0.56 0.75 9.36 8.53 7.49 0.48 2.22 20.64 4.55 4
Trinidad & Tobago  4.68 0.80 0.95 0.70 0.75 6.26 37.15 7.60 1.65 3.93 20.00 0.49 5
United Kingdom 
 
2.98 0.47 0.61 0.40 n.a. 7.53 30.52 12.08 1.16 2.57 1.90 0.62 43
US 4.34 0.20 0.27 0.18 0.21 7.32 12.61 8.71 0.74 3.17 0.27 0.29 236
Weighted average  3.61 0.45 0.57 0.41 0.46 7.04 21.90 9.18 0.90 3.02 3.53 0.64 1430
Notes:  All country-level variables are averages for the period 1995-99, except Bank concentration (Deposits) for which we use data for the year 1999. All bank-
specific variables are year 1995 data, except net interest margins, overhead ratios and bank risk for which we use averages for the period 1995-99. A detailed 
description of the definition and sources of the variables can be found in the Appendix.  n.a. indicates not available. Outliers (above 95% percentile and below 
5% percentile) of the variables net interest margins through fee income are deleted from the dataset. Dataset includes commercial banks only, as defined by 
BankScope. Number of banks is the number of banks in the final sample for each country. The total number of countries is 72. The total number of bank 
observations is 1,430.  
Source:  BankScope. 

























































30.34 11.13  1.38 2.04 3.90 5.00 1.37 0.07 1.25 1 4.60 0.05 0.04
Bahrain 9.40 n.a.  1.08 2.62 4.22 5.00 0.05 0.33 2.25 1 4.00 0.28 0.04
Bangladesh 0.34 0.42  6.47 5.01 2.43 2.00 -0.39 0.79 3.00 1 2.60 0.06 0.70
Belarus 2.23 n.a.  238.51 2.91 2.22 2.60 -0.76 0.00 3.25 1 3.00 0.03 0.67
Belgium 28.33 5.58  1.45 2.45 3.90 5.00 0.90 0.00 2.25 1 4.00 n.a. n.a.
Bolivia 0.94 0.01  7.43 4.02 3.23 3.20 0.02 0.00 3.00 1 3.60 0.42 0.00
Botswana 3.59 0.01  8.60 5.60 2.95 4.00 0.56 0.33 2.50 1 3.80 0.98 0.02
Burundi 0.15 0.00  18.54 -2.29 1.83 2.00 -1.01 0.33 3.00 1 2.00 0.00 0.63
Canada 20.55 32.03  1.61 3.31 3.89 5.00 1.43 0.13 1.75 0 4.00 n.a. 0.00
Chile 5.00 16.98  6.04 5.64 3.68 5.00 0.87 n.a. 2.75 0 3.00 0.32 0.12
Croatia 3.85 0.26  4.51 4.34 2.39 2.25 0.03 n.a. 1.75 1 3.00 0.07 0.37
Cyprus 12.52 0.04  2.61 3.91 3.36 3.25 1.02 0.00 2.00 0 4.00 0.11 0.03
Czech Rep.  5.16 7.12  7.86 1.36 3.77 4.00 0.68 0.36 2.00 1 5.00 0.26 0.19
Denmark 35.97 14.34  2.15 2.53 3.86 5.00 1.58 0.08 2.00 1 4.00 n.a. 0.00
Egypt 1.11 1.15  6.96 5.36 2.51 2.80 -0.15 1.00 3.25 1 3.40 0.04 0.67
Estonia 3.66 n.a.  14.78 4.48 3.59 4.00 0.61 0.00 2.00 0 4.00 0.85 0.00
Finland 27.79 15.10  1.07 4.72 3.78 5.00 1.62 0.00 1.75 1 3.00 0.08 0.22
France 27.72 23.75  1.24 2.14 3.65 4.00 1.02 0.00 1.50 1 3.00 n.a. n.a.
Germany 30.79 23.76  1.31 1.51 3.80 5.00 1.37 0.00 1.25 1 3.60 0.04 0.42
Ghana 0.39 0.35  32.19 4.38 2.72 3.00 -0.14 0.78 3.00 1 3.00 0.54 0.38
Greece 11.90 5.24  6.01 2.96 3.12 4.00 0.63 0.00 2.25 0 2.00 0.05 0.13
Guatemala 1.50 0.03  8.11 4.18 3.21 3.00 -0.50 0.30 3.25 1 3.60 0.05 0.08
Honduras 0.71 3.29  19.77 2.76 2.68 3.00 -0.43 0.20 2.25 1 3.00 0.02 0.01
Hungary 4.71 0.79  18.85 3.35 3.01 4.00 0.87 0.33 2.25 1 3.80 0.62 0.03
Iceland 28.49 0.01  2.13 4.21 3.82 5.00 1.35 n.a. 2.75 1 3.00 0.00 0.64
India 0.41 3.66  8.85 6.49 2.19 3.00 0.00 0.47 2.50 1 2.00 0.00 0.80
Indonesia 1.05 7.12  20.45 1.69 2.97 3.00 -0.76 0.60 3.50 0 2.80 0.07 0.44
Ireland 21.60 0.21  1.95 9.31 3.98 5.00 1.40 0.00 2.00 1 4.00 n.a. n.a.
Israel 16.30 10.57  8.19 4.02 3.17 4.00 0.68 n.a. 3.25 0 3.00 n.a. n.a.
Italy 19.65 7.99  2.97 1.76 3.54 4.00 0.91 0.26 2.50 0 3.60 0.05 0.17






















































42.39 23.99  0.41 1.16 3.99 5.00 0.95 0.00 3.25 1 3.20 0.06 0.01
Jordan 1.61 7.84  3.38 3.51 3.08 4.00 0.33 n.a. 2.75 1 4.00 0.68 0.00
Kenya 0.34 0.72  6.01 2.71 2.78 3.00 -0.78 0.85 2.50 1 3.60 n.a. n.a.
Korea Rep. of  11.48 40.63  4.44 4.98 3.76 5.00 0.48 n.a. 2.25 1 3.80 0.00 0.30
Kuwait 15.94 0.24  2.01 -1.11 3.48 5.00 0.34 n.a. 2.50 1 3.00 0.00 0.00
Latvia 2.19 n.a.  11.61 3.22 3.10 3.00 0.26 0.00 2.00 1 3.75 n.a. n.a.
Lebanon 2.86 0.00  n.a. 3.45 2.88 3.00 -0.09 0.00 2.75 1 4.00 0.27 0.00
Lithuania 1.91 0.01  15.80 3.30 2.85 3.00 0.26 0.50 2.25 1 2.75 0.48 0.44
Luxembourg 47.99 0.01  1.33 5.29 4.05 5.00 1.46 0.00 1.50 1 4.00 0.95 0.05
Macedonia (FYR) 
 
1.30 n.a. 3.88 1.43 n.a. n.a. -0.33 n.a. 3.25 1 n.a. 0.93 0.01
Malta 9.41 0.00  2.82 4.60 2.83 3.40 0.85 0.00 2.50 1 3.00 0.49 0.00
Mauritius 3.85 0.00  6.63 4.98 3.35 4.00 0.69 n.a. 3.25 1 4.00 0.26 0.00
México 3.39 12.03  24.50 2.90 2.86 3.20 -0.07 n.a. 3.00 n.a. 2.00 0.20 0.25
Moldova 0.67 0.65  18.71 -3.12 2.52 3.00 -0.20 0.33 1.75 1 2.60 0.33 0.07
Morocco 1.34 7.35  2.72 1.91 3.08 3.60 0.19 0.00 3.25 1 3.00 0.19 0.24
Namibia 2.32 0.00  8.33 3.89 3.12 4.00 0.47 0.67 2.75 1 4.00 n.a. n.a.
Nepal 0.22 0.40  7.79 4.15 2.53 2.75 -0.29 0.21 2.00 1 2.00 0.35 0.20
Netherlands 28.45 62.53  2.06 3.27 4.00 5.00 1.64 0.00 1.50 0 5.00 n.a. 0.06
New Zealand  16.70 0.14  1.68 2.56 4.21 5.00 1.59 0.00 1.00 0 5.00 0.99 0.00
Nigeria 0.25 0.05  25.45 2.46 2.73 3.00 -1.00 0.00 2.25 1 2.20 0.00 0.13
Norway 35.90 16.66  2.18 3.26 3.60 5.00 1.53 n.a. 2.50 1 3.00 n.a. n.a.
Panama 3.12 0.00  1.09 3.27 3.56 3.00 0.11 0.06 2.00 1 5.00 0.38 0.12
Peru 2.33 6.64 8.39 3.75 3.10 3.20 -0.18 0.00 2.00 1 4.00 0.40 0.03
Philippines 1.13 19.88  7.86 3.69 3.10 3.80 0.21 0.34 1.75 1 3.00 0.13 0.12
Poland 3.22 2.18  16.40 5.74 2.96 3.80 0.70 0.00 2.50 0 3.00 0.26 0.44
Romania 1.37 0.01  66.15 -0.43 2.55 2.00 -0.08 0.35 3.25 1 3.00 0.08 0.70
Russian Fed.  2.22 0.13  74.66 -1.23 2.54 3.00 -0.54 n.a. 2.00 1 3.60 0.09 0.68
Rwanda 0.22 0.00  5.81 15.67 1.83 1.00 -1.18 0.00 3.25 1 1.00 0.50 0.50
Singapore 24.95 0.71  0.97 6.02 4.54 5.00 1.44 n.a. 2.00 1 4.00 0.50 0.00
Slovenia 10.23 0.02  9.32 4.24 2.83 3.25 0.85 0.00 2.25 1 4.00 0.05 0.40
South Africa  3.93 10.88  7.32 2.46 3.08 3.00 0.11 0.26 2.00 1 3.00 0.05 0.00

























Spain 15.86 10.69  2.87 3.32 3.48 4.00 1.11 1.75 0 3.60 0.11 0.00








28.26 40.29  0.77 2.70 3.49 4.00 1.53 2.25 0 3.60 0.02 0.00
Switzerland 44.34 101.15 1.11 4.06 4.75 1.72 0.00 1.25 0 4.75 0.09







  0.80 0.15
0.07
33.86  5.12 1.44 3.66 4.60 0.15 1.00 2.25 1 3.00 0.07 0.31
Trinidad & Tobago  4.53 0.03  4.25 4.48 3.40 5.00 0.59 0.25 2.25 0 4.00 0.08 0.15
United Kingdom 
 
20.19 2.79 2.72 4.13 5.00 1.50 n.a. 1.25 1 5.00 n.a. 0.00
US 29.25 70.32 2.36 3.72 4.16 5.00 1.29 0.00 3.00 0 4.00 0.05 0.00
Weighted average  22.50 0.35 4.37 3.02 3.65 4.38 0.93 0.09 2.25 0.60 3.66 0.13 0.16
Notes:  All variables are averages for the period 1995-99, except value traded for which we use year 1995 data. A detailed description of the definition and 
sources of the variables can be found in the Appendix.  n.a. indicates not available. 
 
  46Table 3.  Summary statistics and correlation matrix for entire sample by variable 
Panel A  Summary statistics 
Variable        Observations Mean  Std. Dev.   Minimum Maximum
Net interest margin  1,430 3.61 2.03 0.72  12.60
Bank concentration  1,430 0.45 0.21 0.20  1.00
Bank concentration (Top-5)  1,430 0.57 0.22 0.27  1.00
Bank concentration (All)  1,430 0.41 0.20 0.18  0.97
Bank concentration (Deposits)  1,330 0.46 0.24 0.12  1.00
Bank size  1,430 7.04 2.02 1.74  13.49
Liquidity   
   
   
1,375 21.90 16.42 0.23 82.19
Bank equity  1,429 9.18 6.97 -0.77  78.76
Fee income  1,426 0.90 1.52 -6.39  13.80
Overhead 1,430 3.02 1.65 0.64 10.18
Market share  1,430 0.04 0.09 0.00  0.98
Bank risk  1,430 0.64 1.12 0.00  11.52
GDP per capita  1,430 22.50 14.25 0.15  47.99
Value traded  1,409 0.35 0.35 0.00  1.47
Inflation 1,402 4.37 9.05 0.41 238.51
GDP growth  1,430 3.02 1.59 -3.12  15.67
KKZ Institution index  1,430 0.93 0.62 -1.18  1.72
Economic freedom  1,428 3.65 0.54 1.83  4.54
Property rights  1,428 4.38 0.81 1.00  5.00
Fraction entry denied  1,273 0.09 0.18 0.00  1.00
Activity restrictions  1,430 2.25 0.73 1.00  3.50
Reserve requirements  1,419 0.60 0.49 0.00  1.00
Banking freedom   1,428 3.66 0.73 1.00  5.00
Foreign ownership  1,093 0.13 0.20 0.00  0.99
State ownership  1,258 0.16 0.22 0.00  0.80
Notes:  All country-level variables are averages for the period 1995-99, except Bank concentration (Deposits) for which we use data for the year 1999. All bank-
specific variables are year 1995 data, except net interest margins, overhead ratios and bank risk for which we use averages for the period 1995-99. A detailed 
description of the definition and sources of the variables can be found in the Appendix. 
 









traded Inflation  GDP  growth
Net interest margin  1.000   
Bank concentration  **0.083  1.000  
Bank size  **-0.379  **-0.226 1.000  
Liquidity   
 
**-0.053  **0.143 **-0.175 1.000
Bank equity  **0.247  **0.186 **-0.454 **0.083 1.000  
Fee income  0.012  **0.155 **-0.109 **0.153 **0.186 1.000 
GDP per capita  **-0.452  **-0.234 **0.270 **-0.210 **-0.162 -0.021  1.000
Value traded  **-0.207  **-0.139 **0.146 **-0.191 **0.057 0.008  **0.418 1.000
Inflation **0.382  **0.180 **-0.202 **0.164 **0.112 **0.107  **-0.444 **-0.309 1.000
GDP growth  **0.163  **-0.069 -0.050 **0.067 0.020 **-0.114  **-0.456 -0.012 0.046 1.000
KKZ Institution index  **-0.426  **-0.104 **0.220 **-0.232 **-0.082 **0.006  **0.804 **0.533 **-0.485 **-0.232
Economic freedom  **-0.339  **-0.267 **0.301 **-0.327 **-0.118 **-0.077  **0.775 **0.636 **-0.463 **-0.307
Property rights  **-0.376  **-0.237 **0.355 **-0.260 **-0.159 **-0.089  **0.754 **0.547 **-0.435 **-0.224
Fraction entry denied  **0.210  **0.189 **-0.144 **0.161 0.040 0.009  **-0.617 **-0.348 **0.309 **0.218
Entry fit test  **0.131  **0.341 **-0.116 0.045 **0.100 0.023  **-0.129 **0.170 **0.104 **0.109
Activity restrictions  **0.274  **-0.316 **0.146 **-0.181 **-0.090 **-0.212  **-0.183 -0.006 **0.160 **0.259
Reserve requirements  -0.035  0.042 -0.020 **0.141 **-0.052 0.022  **-0.173 **-0.401 **0.068 -0.038
Banking freedom  **-0.167  **0.154 -0.028 **-0.067 0.036 **0.079  **0.386 **0.445 **-0.232 **-0.233
Foreign ownership  0.046  **0.235 **-0.137* **0.137 0.008 0.011  **-0.109 **-0.296 **0.066 **0.240
State ownership  0.009  **0.070 **-0.143* **0.254 0.054 **0.070  **-0.395 **-0.213 **0.299 **0.237
 





















KKZ Institution index  1.000    




   
   
 
Property rights  **0.825  **0.904 1.000  
Fraction entry denied  **-0.629  **-0.630 **-0.560 1.000
Activity restrictions  **-0.380  **-0.066 **-0.071 **0.194 1.000
Reserve requirements  **-0.338  **-0.332 **-0.249 **0.154 **-0.205 1.000
Banking freedom  **0.589  **0.629 **0.500 **-0.377 **-0.305 **-0.329 1.000
Foreign ownership  -0.044  -0.043 **-0.069 -0.024 **-0.149 **0.198 **0.174 1.000
State ownership  **-0.409  **-0.613 **-0.454 **0.538 **-0.122 **0.322 **-0.556 **-0.215 1.000
Notes:  All country-level variables are averages for the period 1995-99, except Bank concentration (Deposits) for which we use data for the year 1999. All bank-
specific variables are year 1995 data, except net interest margins, overhead ratios and bank risk for which we use averages for the period 1995-99. A detailed 
description of the definition and sources of the variables can be found in the Appendix. ** indicates significance at a 5% level. 
 
  49Table 4.  Regression results controlling for bank regulatory environment 
       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bank  concentration  **2.782 **2.326 **2.584 **2.206 
  (1.313) (1.055) (1.141) (1.108) 
Bank  size  ***-0.179 ***-0.182 ***-0.185 ***-0.180 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) 
Liquidity ***-0.015  ***-0.018  ***-0.017  ***-0.019 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Bank  equity  **0.015 ***0.024 ***0.019 ***0.024 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Fee  income  **-0.065 -0.024 -0.034 -0.029 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Fraction  of  entry  denied  **2.760 — — — 
  (1.155)     
Activity  restrictions  —  ***1.366 — — 
    (0.378)   
Reserve  requirements  — —  *1.036 — 
     (0.577)  
Banking  freedom  — — —  ***-0.963 
       (0.294) 
       
R2-within  0.096 0.107 0.101 0.107 
R2-between  0.209 0.232 0.165 0.221 
No.  observations  1217 1372 1362 1371 
No.  countries  55 71 69 70 
Notes:  Dependent variable is net interest margin. All country-level variables are averages for the period 1995-99. 
All bank-specific variables are year 1995 data, except net interest margins for which we use averages for the period 
1995-99. A detailed description of the definition and sources of the variables can be found in the Appendix. We use 
GLS with random country effects. A constant term was included, but is not reported. *, **, *** indicate significance 
levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
 
  50Table 5.  Regression results controlling for macro environment 
          
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Bank concentration  **2.314  ***2.889  1.834  **2.727  *2.066 
 (1.080)  (1.122)  (1.164)  (1.150)  (1.140) 
Bank size  ***-0.179  ***-0.181  ***-0.177  ***-0.162  ***-0.155 
 (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Liquidity ***-0.019  ***-0.018  ***-0.020  ***-0.020  ***-0.021 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Bank equity  ***0.022  ***0.024  ***0.024  ***0.025  ***0.024 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Fee income  -0.024  -0.031  0.001  0.006  0.010 
 (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
Inflation ***0.041  —  —  —  ***0.090 
 (0.009)        (0.023) 
GDP growth  —  *-0.202  —  —  -0.024 
   (0.104)      (0.108) 
Total value traded  —  —  ***-2.847  —  *-1.640 
     (0.906)    (0.889) 
State ownership  —  —  —  **2.559  -0.432 
       (1.108)  (1.219) 
          
R2-within 0.106  0.107  0.110  0.113  0.114 
R2-between 0.293  0.165  0.237  0.196  0.461 
No. observations  1344  1372  1352  1206  1168 
No. countries  70  71  66  63  58 
Notes:  Dependent variable is net interest margin. All country-level variables are averages for the period 1995-99, 
except total value traded for which we use 1995 data. All bank-specific variables are year 1995 data, except net 
interest margins for which we use averages for the period 1995-99. For more details on the definition and source of 
the variables, see the Appendix. Results estimated using GLS with random country effects. A constant term was 
included, but is not reported. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
 
  51Table 6.  Regression results controlling for macro and regulatory environment 
       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bank  concentration  1.923 *1.971 *2.046 *1.840 
  (1.226) (1.029) (1.088) (1.057) 
Bank  size  ***-0.178 ***-0.180 ***-0.183 ***-0.178 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Liquidity ***-0.016  ***-0.019  ***-0.018  ***-0.020 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Bank  equity  *0.013 ***0.022 ***0.017 ***0.022 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Fee  income  *-0.058 -0.020 -0.030 -0.024 
  (0.006) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Inflation  ***0.039 ***0.036 ***0.040 ***0.038 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Fraction  of  entry  denied  ***2.718 — — — 
 (1.052)       
Activity  restrictions  —  ***1.008 — — 
    (0.373)   
Reserve requirements      0.737  — 
     (0.542)  
Banking  freedom  — — —  ***-0.774 
      (0.279) 
       
R2-within  0.095 0.106 0.099 0.106 
R2-between  0.382 0.349 0.330 0.374 
No.  observations  1189 1344 1334 1343 
No.  countries  54 70 68 69 
Notes:  Dependent variable is net interest margin. All country-level variables are averages for the period 1995-99. 
All bank-specific variables are year 1995 data, except net interest margins for which we use averages for the period 
1995-99. For more details on the definition and source of the variables, see the Appendix. We use GLS with random 
country effects. A constant term was included, but is not reported. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, 
and 1 percent respectively. 
 
  52Table 7.  Regression results controlling for institutional environment 
      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bank  concentration  0.939 1.571 0.929 1.214 
 (1.027)  (0.970)  (1.045)  (1.057) 
Bank  size  ***-0.174 ***-0.172 ***-0.170 ***-0.170 
 (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Liquidity ***-0.019  ***-0.020  ***-0.020  ***-0.020 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Bank  equity  ***0.022 ***0.022 ***0.023 ***0.022 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Fee  income  -0.023 -0.024 -0.027 -0.027 
 (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026) 
Inflation  ***0.031 ***0.023 ***0.025 ***0.028 
 (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
GDP  per  capita  ***-0.088 — — — 
  (0.018)    
KKZ Institution index   —  ***-1.797  —  — 
   (0.301)     
Economic  freedom  — —  ***-2.046 — 
     (0.415)  
Property rights  —  —  —  ***-1.132 
       (0.249) 
      
R2-within  0.106 0.106 0.107 0.107 
R2-between  0.475 0.540 0.503 0.475 
No.  observations  1344 1344 1343 1343 
No.  countries  70 70 69 69 
Notes:  Dependent variable is net interest margin. All country-level variables are averages for the period 1995-99. 
All bank-specific variables are year 1995 data, except net interest margins for which we use averages for the period 
1995-99. For more details on the definition and source of the variables, see the Appendix. We use GLS with random 
country effects. A constant term was included, but is not reported. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, 
and 1 percent respectively. 
 
  53Table 8.  Regression results controlling for macro, regulatory, and institutional environment 
     
  (1) (2) (3) 
Bank  concentration  1.159 1.152 1.228 
  (1.206) (1.031) (1.058) 
Bank  size  ***-0.171 ***-0.171 ***-0.170 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Liquidity ***-0.017  ***-0.020  ***-0.020 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Bank  equity  ***0.013 ***0.022 ***0.022 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Fee  income  **-0.058 -0.025 -0.027 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Inflation  ***0.028 ***0.027 ***0.028 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Property  rights  ***-1.114 ***-1.048 ***-1.037 
  (0.296) (0.253) (0.286) 
Fraction of entry denied  1.503  —  — 
 (1.069)    
Activity restrictions  —  0.449  — 
   (0.389)   
Banking freedom  —  —  -0.213 
     (0.316) 
     
R2-within  0.095 0.107 0.107 
R2-between  0.504 0.483 0.478 
No.  observations  1189 1343 1343 
No.  countries  54 69 69 
Notes:  Dependent variable is net interest margin. All country-level variables are averages for the period 1995-99. 
All bank-specific variables are year 1995 data, except net interest margins for which we use averages for the period 
1995-99. For more details on the definition and source of the variables, see the Appendix. We use GLS with random 
country effects. A constant term was included, but is not reported. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, 
and 1 percent respectively. 
 
  54Table 9.  Regression results using alternative bank concentration measures and controlling for regulations 
           
                   
               
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Bank  concentration  (Top-5) 1.386 1.423 1.482 — — — — — —
  (1.238)  (1.078)  (1.106)      
             
           
                 
       
         
             
 
             
                   
                 
           
                 
                   
                 
           
             
               
             
               
   
               
        
                   
                   
                   
                   
Bank  concentration  (All)
 
— — — 0.875 0.827 0.891 — — —
(1.257) (1.078) (1.107)
Bank  concentration  (Deposits)
 
— — — — — — 0.889 0.998 1.006
  (1.189)  (1.161)  (1.200)
Bank size 
 





(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Liquidity
 




***-0.018  ***-0.019  ***-0.019 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Bank  equity
 
**0.013 ***0.022 ***0.022 **0.013 ***0.022 ***0.022 0.010 ***0.022 ***0.022
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Fee income 
 
**-0.058  -0.025  -0.027  **-0.058 -0.025 -0.027 -0.027 -0.022 -0.024
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Inflation
 
***0.028 ***0.027 ***0.028 ***0.028 ***0.027 ***0.028 ***0.029 ***0.026 ***0.028
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Property rights 
 





(0.294) (0.251) (0.283) (0.296) (0.254) (0.287) (0.311) (0.298) (0.347)
Fraction  of  entry  denied
 
1.455 — — 1.509 — — 1.673 — —
(1.071) (1.072) (1.126)









(0.387)   (0.389)   (0.448)
Banking  freedom
 
— — -0.207 — — -0.206 — — -0.255
(0.315)   (0.317)   (0.377)
R2-within 0.095 0.107 0.107 0.095 0.107 0.107 0.099 0.114 0.114
R2-between 0.508 0.487 0.482 0.501 0.479 0.473 0.508 0.461 0.454
No.  observations 1189 1343 1343 1189 1343 1343 1159 1247 1247
No.  countries 54 69 69 54 69 69 50 59 59
Notes:  Dependent variable is net interest margin. All country-level variables are averages for the period 1995-99, except Bank concentration (Deposits) for 
which we use data for the year 1999. All bank-specific variables are year 1995 data, except net interest margins for which we use averages for the period 1995-
99. For more details on the definition and source of the variables, see the Appendix. We use GLS with random country effects. A constant term was included, but 
is not reported. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
 
  55Table 10.  Regression results controlling for high concentration, institutions and regulatory 
restrictions 
 
 High  concentration 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Bank concentration  1.409  1.233  1.154 
 (1.537)  (1.412)  (1.454) 
High bank concentration  0.183  -0.021  -0.242 
 (2.450)  (2.088)  (2.159) 
Bank size  ***-0.171  ***-0.171  ***-0.170 
 (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Liquidity ***-0.017  ***-0.020  ***-0.020 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Bank equity  **0.013  ***0.022  ***0.022 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Fee income  **-0.058  -0.025  -0.027 
 (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026) 
Inflation ***0.028  ***0.025  ***0.028 
 (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Property rights  ***-1.084  ***-1.046  ***-1.055 
 (0.351)  (0.290)  (0.311) 
Property rights * high bank concentration  -0.115  -0.010  0.079 
 (0.634)  (0.518)  (0.539) 
Fraction of entry denied  1.550  —  — 
 (1.121)     
Activity restrictions  —  0.451  — 
   (0.397)   
Banking freedom  —  —  -0.224 
     (0.329) 
      
R2-within 0.095  0.107  0.107 
R2-between 0.505  0.483  0.493 
No. observations  1189  1343  1343 
No. countries  54  69  69 
Notes:  Dependent variable is net interest margin. All country-level variables are averages for the period 1995-99. 
All bank-specific variables are year 1995 data, except net interest margin for which we use averages for the period 
1995-99. For more details on the definition and source of the variables, see the Appendix. High bank concentration 
is a dummy variable that takes value of one if the country has a concentration ratio of more than 80 percent, and zero 
otherwise. We use GLS with random country effects. A constant term was included, but is not reported. *, **, *** 
indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
  56Table 11.  Regression results using an alternative efficiency measure and controlling for 
institutions and regulatory restrictions 
 Overhead  costs 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Bank  concentration  0.056 -0.081 -0.057 
  (0.820) (0.735) (0.737) 
Bank  size  ***-0.133 ***-0.132 ***-0.132 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Liquidity 0.002  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Bank  equity  -0.002 0.006 0.006 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Fee  income  ***0.362 ***0.373 ***0.372 
  (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) 
Inflation  *0.012 *0.012 *0.013 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Property  rights  ***-0.564 ***-0.587 ***-0.584 
  (0.205) (0.182) (0.200) 
Fraction of entry denied  0.008  —  — 
  (0.739)   
Activity restrictions  —  0.142  — 
   (0.276)   
Banking freedom  —  —  -0.065 
     (0.220) 
     
R2-within  0.210 0.212 0.212 
R2-between  0.525 0.517 0.515 
No.  observations  1189 1343 1343 
No.  countries  54 69 69 
Notes:  Dependent variable is overhead costs over total average assets, average for the period 1995-99. All country-
level variables are averages for the period 1995-99. All bank-specific independent variables are year 1995 data. For 
more details on the definition and source of the variables, see the Appendix. We use GLS with random country 
effects. A constant term was included, but is not reported. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 
1 percent respectively. 
 
  57Table 12.  Regression results controlling for bank risk, institutions and regulatory restrictions 
       
                   
                   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Bank  concentration **2.814 1.925 *1.963 *1.827 0.906 1.193 1.157 1.133 1.207
  (1.122)                 
                   
                 
 
                 
                   
                 
           
                 
                   
                 
                   
                 
           
 
             
 
           
 
           
 
       
 
      
                   
                   
                   
                   
(1.239) (1.037) (1.065) (1.052) (1.065) (1.219) (1.040) (1.066)
Bank  size
 
***-0.182 ***-0.180 ***-0.180 ***-0.178 ***-0.171 ***-0.171 ***-0.174 ***-0.171 ***-0.171
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Liquidity
 
***-0.018  ***-0.016  ***-0.019  ***-0.020  ***-0.020  ***-0.020  ***-0.017  ***-0.020  ***-0.020 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Bank  equity
 
***0.024 **0.013 ***0.022 ***0.022 ***0.023 ***0.023 **0.013 ***0.023 ***0.023
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Fee income 
 
-0.029  **-0.053  -0.019  -0.023 -0.025 -0.025 **-0.053 -0.024 -0.025
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Bank  risk
 
0.001 -0.075 -0.020 -0.023 -0.029 -0.028 -0.075 -0.027 -0.028
(0.041) (0.051) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.051) (0.042) (0.042)
Inflation
 
— ***0.040 ***0.036 ***0.038 ***0.025 ***0.029 ***0.029 ***0.027 ***0.029
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Fraction  of  entry  denied
 














































—  ***-1.139  ***-1.115  ***-1.057  ***-1.045
  (0.251)
 
  (0.299)  (0.255)
 
  (0.288)
R2-within 0.107 0.097 0.106 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.107
R2-between 0.126 0.380 0.347 0.372 0.502 0.474 0.503 0.482 0.477
No.  observations 1372 1189 1344 1343 1343 1343 1189 1343 1343
No.  countries 71 54 70 69 69 69 54 69 69
Notes:  Dependent variable is net interest margin. All country-level variables are averages for the period 1995-99. All bank-specific variables are year 1995 data, 
except net interest margin for which we use averages for the period 1995-99. For more details on the definition and source of the variables, see the Appendix. We 
use GLS with random country effects. A constant term was included, but is not reported. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent 
respectively. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bank  concentration *2.417 **2.474 *2.192 1.318 1.538 1.442 1.499 1.536
  (1.340)               
                 
               
             
       
           
      
             
       
         —
 
       
             
   
                 
                 
(1.161) (1.164) (1.081) (1.065) (1.221) (1.044) (1.068)
Inflation
 
***0.038 ***0.033 ***0.036 ***0.024 ***0.027 ***0.027 ***0.026 ***0.027
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Fraction  of  entry  denied
 
1.805 — — — — 0.523 — —
(1.466)   (1.444)
Activity  restrictions
 
—  **0.989 — — — — 0.315 —
  (0.410) (0.364)
Banking  freedom — — ***-0.810 — — — — -0.189





—  ***-2.028 — —
 
—
  (0.467) 
Property  rights
 




     
R2 0.320 0.321 0.346 0.468 0.457 0.469 0.462 0.460
No.  observations  (countries) 55 71 70 70 70 55 70 70
                 
                 
Notes:  Dependent variable is net interest margin averaged across banks in each country. All country variables are averages for the period 1995-99. Net interest 
margins are country-averages for the period 1995-99. For more details on the definition and source of the variables, see the Appendix. We report OLS estimates 
with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. A constant term was included, but is not reported. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent 
respectively. 
  59Table 14.  Regression results controlling for bank market share, institutions and regulatory restrictions 
       
                   
                   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Bank  concentration *2.004 1.085 1.172 1.225 0.441 0.716 0.576 0.643 0.740
  (1.057)                 
                   
                 
                   
                 
 
                 
                   
                 
           
                 
                   
                 
           
 
             
 
           
 
           
 
       
 
      
                   
                   
                   
                   
(1.069) (0.944) (0.989) (0.979) (0.988) (1.077) (0.959) (0.996)
Market  share
 
***1.583 ***1.677 ***1.621 **1.336 **1.171 **1.164 **1.347 **1.195 **1.142
(0.577) (0.644) (0.570) (0.576) (0.573) (0.575) (0.645) (0.574) (0.575)
Bank  size
 
***-0.220 ***-0.214 ***-0.219 ***-0.210 ***-0.198 ***-0.197 ***-0.199 ***-0.199 ***-0.197
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Liquidity
 
***-0.018  ***-0.015  ***-0.019  ***-0.019  ***-0.020  ***-0.020  ***-0.016  ***-0.019  ***-0.020 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Bank  equity
 
***0.023 *0.012 ***0.021 ***0.022 ***0.023 ***0.022 ***0.013 ***0.022 ***0.022
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Fee income 
 
-0.026  **-0.054  -0.017  -0.022 -0.026 -0.025 **-0.055 -0.023 -0.025
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Inflation
 
— ***0.040 ***0.036 ***0.038 ***0.025 ***0.029 ***0.029 ***0.028 ***0.029
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Fraction  of  entry  denied
 














































—  ***-1.065  ***-1.046  ***-0.978  ***-0.981
  (0.229)
 
  (0.260)  (0.231)
 
  (0.263)
R2-within 0.106 0.095 0.105 0.106 0.107 0.107 0.096 0.107 0.107
R2-between 0.220 0.430 0.414 0.415 0.528 0.501 0.527 0.510 0.503
No.  observations 1372 1189 1344 1343 1343 1343 1189 1343 1343
No.  countries 71 54 70 69 69 69 54 69 69
Notes:  Dependent variable is net interest margin. All country-level variables are averages for the period 1995-99. All bank-specific variables are year 1995 data, 
except net interest margin for which we use averages for the period 1995-99. For more details on the definition and source of the variables, see the Appendix. We 
use GLS with random country effects. A constant term was included, but is not reported. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent 
respectively. 
 
  60Appendix.  Description of Variables and Data Sources 
       
Variable name   Description and source 
       
       
Bank market structure:    
       
  Number of Banks
1  Number of commercial banks in existence as of end-1999 (Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision question 1.2). 
    
  
Bank concentration
 2  A measure of the degree of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest 
commercial banks in each country, average over the period 1995-99. 
      
  
Bank concentration (Top-5) 
2  A measure of the degree of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the five largest 
commercial banks in each country, average over the period 1995-99. 
    
  
Bank concentration (All) 
2  A measure of the degree of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest 
commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks and/or non-bank credit institutions in each country, average over the 
period 1995-99. 
    
  
Bank concentration (Deposits) 
1 A measure of the degree of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of deposits held by the five largest 
commercial banks in each country as of end-1999. 
    
Bank-specific variables:   
    
  Net interest margin
2  Interest income minus interest expense divided by interest-bearing assets,  average over the period 1995-99. 
    
  Bank size
2  Logarithm of total individual bank assets in millions of U.S. dollars, year 1995. 
    
  Bank Equity
2  Bank equity divided by total assets, year 1995. 
    
  Liquidity
2  Liquid bank assets divided by total bank assets, year 1995. 
    
 Overhead
2  Overhead costs divided by total assets, year 1995. 
    
 Fee income
2  Other operating income divided by total assets, year 1995. 
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Variable name   Description and source 
       
     
 Bank risk
2  Standard deviation of the return on average assets over the period 1995-99. 
    
 Market share
2  Individual bank assets over total commercial bank assets as reported by Bankscope, year 1995. 
    
Regulatory restrictions:    
       
  
Fraction of Entry Denied
1  A measure of the number of entry applications denied as a fraction of the number of applications received from domestic and 
foreign entities (ratio of Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision questions 1.9.1 and 1.10.1 to 1.9 and 1.10). 
    
  
Activity Restrictions
1  A measure of a bank's ability to engage in the businesses of securities underwriting, insurance, and real estate, and of the 
regulatory restrictiveness of banks to own shares in non-financial firms (sum of Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision 
questions 4.1 through 4.4). 
       
 
Banking freedom
3  An indicator of banking freedom (ranging from 1 to 5), averaged over 1995-99 period. Greater values signify more freedom. 
Calculated as 6 minus the banking freedom index of the Heritage Foundation. 
    
 
Reserve requirements
1  Takes value of one if banks are required to hold either liquidity reserves or any reserves whatsoever on deposits at the Central 
Bank? (Based on question 7.3 of Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision). 
    
Ownership:    
    
 
State ownership
1  A measure of the degree of government ownership of banks, measured as the fraction of the banking system's assets that is in 
banks that are 50% or more government owned (Question 3.7 in the Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision). 
    
 
Foreign ownership
1  A measure of the degree of foreign ownership of banks, measured as the fraction of the banking system's assets that is in banks 
that are 50% or more foreign owned (Question 3.8 in the Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision). 
    
Institutional environment:    
 
Economic freedom
3  An indicator of economic freedom (ranging from 1 to 5), averaged over 1995-99 period. Greater values signify more freedom. 
Calculated as 6 minus the economic freedom index of the Heritage Foundation. 
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Variable name   Description and source 
       
    
 
Property rights
3  An indicator of the protection of private property rights (ranging from 1 to 5), averaged over 1995-99 period. Greater values 
signify better protection of property rights). Calculated as 6 minus the property freedom index of the Heritage Foundation. 
    
 
KKZ Institution index  An indicator of the quality of institutional development in the country. Calculated as the average of six indicators: voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Average 
for the period 1998. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, Zoido-Lobaton (2001). 
       
  GDP per capita
4  GDP per capita expressed in thousands of 1995 U.S. dollars, averaged over the period 1995-99. 
      
Other variables:    
    
 Total traded value
4  A measure of stock market development. Calculated as total value of stocks traded divided by GDP for the period 1995, in %. 
    
  Inflation
4  Rate of inflation, calculated as log difference of CPI (1995=100) over 1995-99 period. 
    
 GDP growth
4  Growth in GDP expressed in 1995 U.S. dollars, averaged over the 1995-99 period. 
       
   
1 Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001b). Data available at: www.worldbank.org/research/projects/bank_regulation.htm 
2 Source: Fitch IBCA's Bankscope Database 
3 Source: Economic Freedom Index of the Heritage Foundation 
4 Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
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